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5Alternative conceptions of legal rhetoric
Open hand, closed fist
Linda L. Berger
INTRODUCTION
An open-handed image of rhetoric presents an argument against the closed fist of
logic1 and the “nasty, brutish, and short” depictions associated with legal rhetoric.
In 1985, Robert Cover laid bare the field of pain and death where legal interpretation
plays itself out in human consequences.2 Five years later, Gerald Wetlaufer
described a landscape of brutal certainty as the backdrop for much of legal
rhetoric.3 And the arena of criminal trials has long been recognizable as a bleak
setting within which “[j]ustice determines blame and administers pain in a contest
between the offender and the state . . .”4
My purpose in this chapter is to explore alternative conceptions of legal rhetoric.
These alternatives oppose both the Aristotelian view of rhetoric as the “faculty of
observing in any given case the available means of persuasion”5 and the closed
Linda L. Berger is the Family Foundation Professor of Law and the Associate Dean for Faculty
Development and Research at UNLV Boyd School of Law. She is one of the co-editors of the
U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, a collaborative effort to produce and publish an edited collec-
tion of feminist re-visions of influential Supreme Court opinions. Berger is a founder of the peer-
reviewed journal legal communication & rhetoric. Her scholarship on rhetorical theory, study,
and practice can be found in the Journal of Legal Education, the Journal of Law and Policy, the
Michigan State Law Review, and the Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, among
others.
1 Michael Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology (2nd ed.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Billig offers the metaphor of the open and closed
fist for contrasting the opposing arguments provided by logic and rhetoric: “rhetoric possesses an
openness not to be found in the context of logic.” Ibid., 125.
2 Robert M. Cover, “Violence and the Word,” Yale Law Journal 95 (1985): 1601.
3 GeraldWetlaufer, “Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse,” Virginia Law Review 76 (1990): 1545,
1558–1559.
4 Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press,
1990): 181.
5 Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle (Lane Cooper trans., New York: D. Appleton &Co., 1932): 224, bk. I,
ch. I, 1355b, line 26.
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system of legal rhetoric identified by Professor Wetlaufer. Within that system,
Wetlaufer found a linked set of rhetorical commitments. These commitments
included allegiance: “to a certain kind of toughmindedness and rigor, to relevance
and orderliness in discourse, to objectivity, to clarity and logic, to binary judgment,
and to the closure of controversies.” There were commitments as well “to hier-
archy and authority, to the impersonal voice, and to the one right (or best) answer
to questions and the one true (or best) meaning of texts.” All this led Wetlaufer to
conclude that the dominant rhetoric of the law is “the rhetoric of foundations and
logical deductions,” a rhetoric that “relies, above all else, upon the denial that it is
rhetoric that is being done.”6
The practice of legal rhetoric in these terms aims at the construction
of belief rather than the creation of knowledge or understanding. In the
practice described by Wetlaufer, we favor arguments that are clear, orderly,
linear, objective, and rational, and we argue as if the outcome was certain: “the
lawyer is always right and his adversary is always wrong.” If our arguments are
the right ones, the already-certain outcome “ ‘follows’ like the night follows
the day.”7
As counterpoints, this chapter follows the paths suggested by (1) the feminist
proposal from Professors Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin for an invitational rhetoric8
and (2) the blend of rhetoric and social psychology proposed by Professor Michael
Billig as constituting a dialogic “arguing as thinking.”9 Foss and Griffin proposed
a rhetoric that would lead to understanding rather than persuasion. Billig proposed
a rhetoric that would generate further thought rather than permanent changes of
mind.10
Because we assume that legal rhetoric occurs in its most distilled form inside the
courtroom, we may also assume that legal rhetoric is inevitably divisive. Not only
does the courtroom present itself as an arena, the participants behave as if only one
victor can emerge. Simply considering the possibility of alternatives to these assump-
tions carries the potential to transform.11 That potential may be better realized
outside the narrow context of the briefs filed in and the opinions issued by the
U.S. Supreme Court.12
6 Wetlaufer, “Rhetoric and Its Denial,” 1551–1555.
7 Ibid., 1558–1559.
8 Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin, “Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric,”
Communication Monographs 62 (1995): 2–18.
9 Billig, Arguing and Thinking.
10 Ibid., 111.
11 Rosalind Dixon, “Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast,” Harvard Journal of Law and
Gender 31 (2008): 277.
12 See Cheryl L. Nixon and Janet Landman, “Turning Our Minds to Minding the Law,” Social Justice
Research 16 (2003): 169, 187 (pointing out that legal rhetoric does not occur only in the courtroom nor
does it belong only to lawyers and judges).
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As the forum for considering these alternatives, this chapter thus turns to the
transcripts of the death penalty sentencing hearing13 that followed the 1991 murder
trial and conviction of Troy Davis. Davis, a young black man, was convicted of
killing an off-duty white police officer, Mark MacPhail, in Savannah, Georgia, in
1989. The same jury that found him guilty sentenced him to death, and he was
eventually executed in 2011.
INVITATION AND DIALOGUE
Aristotle memorably defined rhetoric as the province of language use devoted to
persuasion “in any given case.” Contemporary rhetoricians define it more broadly,
as encompassing all the ways in which humans use symbols to communicate.14
Within this larger canvas, invitational rhetoric as proposed by Foss and Griffin and
dialogic rhetoric as proposed by Billig may serve as “starting point[s] for thinking in
new ways about communication.”15
Feminism and rhetoric
Rhetoric and feminism are linked in the way that rhetoric is always related to
movements seeking societal change. Women and other groups with little economic
or political power recognize rhetoric as a potentially important source of influence.
At the same time, rhetoric is not entirely friendly terrain. As Foss and Griffin put it,
a “patriarchal bias undergirds most theories of rhetoric.”16 Such a bias implies that if
there are distinctive features of a “feminist” rhetoric, they will battle for acceptance.
And the claim that there is a distinctive feminist rhetoric runs into the arguments of
the anti-essentialists as well as resistance from those not engaged in whatever features
are claimed to be distinctive.
Despite its unitary implications, the concept of “feminist rhetoric” remains useful
if it is viewed more metaphorically, as capturing and reflecting the quality of
“otherness” attributed to groups and speakers that have traditionally been
excluded.17 In this way, feminist arguments can be seen to occur in particular
rhetorical situations. When this situatedness was observed, some feminists claimed
that “the rhetoric itself is intrinsically unique and that this uniqueness is linked
specifically to gender.”18 Other rhetorical scholars described a “feminine style” that
13 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript of the proceedings at the sentencing phase of the trial (August 29–30,
September 3, 1991) (on file with author).
14 Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp,Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric 1 (3rd ed. Long
Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 2002).
15 Bonnie J. Dow, “Feminism, Difference(s), and Rhetorical Studies,” Communication Studies 46
(1995): 106.
16 Foss and Griffin, “Beyond Persuasion,” 2.
17 Dow, “Feminism, Difference(s),” 107.
18 Ibid., 108.
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supports women and feminists in various ways.19The argument quickly encountered
opposition on the ground that there is no one “essential” strand or style of anything
feminist. Later descriptions recharacterized feminine style as a strategic approach
that may be appropriate in particular circumstances, not as an innate characteristic
nor as an approach used only by women.
Some authors suggest that if feminists make distinctive rhetorical choices, it is
because those choices emerge from particular rhetorical contexts with distinctive
audiences, purposes, and constraints. For example, the purpose of much feminist
rhetoric is to disrupt and transform the status quo while the purpose of at least a part
of traditional legal rhetoric is to consolidate and support past practices. Others have
suggested that if there is a primary area of difference in feminist rhetoric, it occurs
when creative thought is generated. “That is, [upon encountering a particular
situation], women may imagine different hypotheses and find different theories
worthy of consideration . . .”20 Thus, for instance, feminists may rely to a greater
extent on the methods of practical reasoning (taking both individual stories and
societal contexts into account) and posing questions that unearth hidden hierarchies
and biases. Similarly, feminist rhetoric may (because of the underlying rhetorical
situations) rely on genres – including personal stories, poetry, parody – and on forms
of argument – including analogies, narratives, and metaphors – that are less expli-
citly visible and accepted in rhetoric’s traditional realm.21
Foss and Griffin gave the feminist label to their invitational rhetoric proposal; in
setting forth his conception of arguing as thinking, Billig responded with some heat
to the claim that conventional legal rhetoric is intrinsically masculine. Billig
acknowledged that it could be said that rhetoric that emphasizes “argumentation
rather than . . . emotional pathos, may be especially masculine.” Still, he responded,
“the idea is based upon the assumption that men and women themselves speak in
a single voice.” Moreover, he wrote, arguing that men and women speak differently
“seems to suggest that there is some sort of hidden biological essence, which leads to
males and females possessing different ways of speaking and thinking.” Instead of
essentially feminist or masculine rhetoric, Billig proposed that “arguments are not
characteristics of individuals, but they are ‘occasioned,’ occurring in particular sorts
of context.” When suited to the occasion, both the content and the form of the
argument may be different than those appropriate for another occasion.
Seeking synthesis, Billig claimed that perceiving “rhetoric as dialogue” promises
a more open conception of rhetoric: arguing as thinking is creative and exploratory.
It requires “bonds of association,” and recognizes that “rudeness, abrasiveness and
19 Ibid., 109.
20 Jeanne L. Schroeder, “Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of
Imagination,” Texas Law Review 70 (1991): 109, 210.
21 For criticisms of the judicial voice as being linked with the class, race, and gender bias in the law, see
Lucinda M. Finley, “Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of
Legal Reasoning,” Notre Dame Law Review 64 (1989): 888; Kathryn M. Stanchi, “Feminist Legal
Writing,” 39 San Diego Law Review 39 (2002): 387.
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aggressive postures” threaten the conversation and lessen the intellectual explora-
tion. Still, rhetoric as dialogue requires the “faculty of negation” because “without it,
the argument, in its dialogic and creative senses, never starts.”22
Invitational rhetoric
Foss and Griffin proposed invitational rhetoric in 1995. They framed it explicitly as
an alternative to the patriarchal traditions of persuasion oriented toward changing
others’ minds.23 Foss and Griffin asserted that invitational rhetoric is grounded in
these feminist principles: “equality, immanent value, and self-determination.”
These principles were defined as a “commitment to the creation of relationships
of equality,” a belief that “every being is a unique and necessary part of the pattern of
the universe and thus has value,” and a “recognition that audience members are the
authorities on their own lives” and have the “right to constitute their worlds as they
choose.”24 Invitational rhetoric could be used for resistance because it “models an
alternative” and “presents an alternative feminist vision rooted in affirmation and
respect.”25
As Foss and Griffin described it, the purpose of an invitational rhetoric is to move
the speaker and the listener closer to understanding of one another; this is unlike the
goal of persuasion in which the speaker aims to move the listener closer to accepting
the speaker’s view. Still, like persuasion, invitational rhetoric describes movement in
only one direction: the speaker invites the audience to understand the speaker’s
world and not vice versa. Foss and Griffin put it this way:
Invitational rhetoric is an invitation to understanding as a means to create
a relationship . . . Invitational rhetoric constitutes an invitation to the audience to
enter the rhetor’s world and to see it as the rhetor does . . . [But] the result of
invitational rhetoric is not just an understanding of an issue. Because of the
nonhierarchical, nonjudgmental, nonadversarial framework established for the
interaction, an understanding of the participants themselves occurs . . .26
Critics responded that the principles Foss and Griffin described were hardly
unique to feminism and that the authors had provided no support for the claim
that they were. In a later response to the critics, several proponents of invitational
rhetoric set forth a more nuanced view. They were arguing neither that all persua-
sion is violent nor that invitational rhetoric is always the better alternative. Instead,
they suggested that “some persuasive rhetoric is violent” and that rhetoric should be
viewed as much more complex and far-reaching than communication based solely
22 Billig, Arguing and Thinking, 26–29.
23 Foss and Griffin, “Beyond Persuasion.”
24 Ibid., 4.
25 Ibid., 16–17.
26 Ibid., 5.
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on persuasion.27 Their ambitious effort hoped to “create a rhetoric built on a new set
of values and to envision how such a rhetoric might work for both women and men
in ways that contribute to the transformation of our culture.”28
Invitational rhetoric’s proponents imply that the encounter they envision is
ethically superior to other rhetorical practice,29 but they acknowledge that its use
“presupposes conditions of economic, political, and social equality between and
among interlocutors.” Because such conditions are rare, some critics have asked
whether invitational rhetoric could ever find a productive setting. These critics point
out that invitational rhetoric assumes that the “oppressors and [the] oppressed” have
shared interests, and they criticize the proponents for being too little concerned that
invitations from those in power too often carry terms and conditions.
New Rhetoric: writing as thinking
In the field of English composition, New Rhetoric is associated with the work of I.A.
Richards and the composition researchers and theorists who followed his lead. New
Rhetoricians described the writing process in ways that foreshadow Billig’s descrip-
tion of arguing as thinking:
The process of making meaning [by writing] is messy, slow, tentative, full of starts
and stops, a complex network of language, purposes, plans, options, and constraints.
Its outcome is uncertain: “Composition requires choosing all along the way, and
you can’t choose if there are no perceived alternatives . . .” In the New Rhetoric,
writing is a process for creating knowledge, not merely a means for communicating
it. In the New Rhetoric, reading is a process for constructing meaning, not just an
Easter egg hunt to find it.30
Rather than clothing already-formed thought in language, writing was recast as
the weaving of thought and knowledge through language. From the New Rhetoric
point of view, “knowledge is not simply a static entity available for retrieval. Truth
is dynamic and dialectical, the result of a process involving the interaction of
opposing elements.” The elements of the communication process – writer, audi-
ence, reality, language – are not used simply to “provide a convenient way of
27 Jennifer Emerling Bone, Cindy L. Griffin, and T. M. Linda Scholz, “Beyond Traditional
Conceptualizations of Rhetoric: Invitational Rhetoric and a Move toward Civility,” Western Journal
of Communication 72:4 (2008): 434–462.
28 Bone et al., “Beyond Traditional Conceptualizations.”
29 Sonja K. Foss, Cindy L. Griffin, and Karen A. Foss, “Transforming Rhetoric through Feminist
Reconstruction: A Response to the Gender Diversity Perspective,” Women’s Studies in
Communication 20:2 (1992): 117–136.
30 Linda L. Berger, “Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and
Writer, Text and Context,” Journal of Legal Education 49 (1999): 155, 155–157. See Ann E. Berthoff,
“Rhetoric as Hermeneutic,” College Composition and Communication (1991): 279, 281 (citing
I. A. Richards, How to Read a Page 204, 217 (Boston, 1942)).
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talking about rhetoric. They form the elements that go into the very shaping of
knowledge.”31
Michael Billig: arguing as thinking
Michael Billig’s dialogic rhetoric builds on what he considers the fundamentally
argumentative structure, or the two-sidedness, of human thinking. In his words:
“[H]umans do not converse because they have inner thoughts to express, but they
have thoughts to express because they are able to converse.”32 Dialogue offers the
power to open up thinking by providing an argumentative heuristic that moves
through recursive rounds of discussion, justification, and criticism, always consider-
ing the argumentative context (or, in other words, taking into account not only what
is said but also what is being argued against).
Within Billig’s dialogic rhetoric, there are two primary movements. First, the
movement from categories to particulars and back (and forth and back) constitutes
the basic form of dialogue. Second, themovement from criticism to justification and
back (and forth and back) is the basic form of thinking. In the first movement, Billig
focuses on the back-and-forth “battle” of the logos of the general and the anti-logos of
the particular. In his version of this dialogue, the rules and approaches are necessa-
rily provisional or contingent because the uniqueness of each moment and each
rhetorical situation produces ambiguity and uncertainty. Billig calls this Quintilian’s
Principle of Uncertainty,33 that is, uncertainty exists because each human situation
is different and they are infinitely varied. Still, we learn from the experience we gain
from each situation. In the second movement, every justification begins with
a criticism, implied or explicit. Thus, offering a justification presupposes that some-
one already has criticized or will soon criticize our stance.34 The criticism depends
on some deviation from an accepted norm. As a result, to understand an argument,
we should ask, “What is the object of the argument’s attack?” Only when we under-
stand what the speaker is arguing against are we able to fully grasp the argument
itself.35
This principle is illustrated by Billig’s own discussion. His meanings become clear
when read within their argumentative context.36 Billig is criticizing a particular view
of the relationship between rhetoric and social psychology. That is, he doubts that
psychologists are correct when they assume or claim that there is a real difference
between rhetoric and modern scientific research and that the scientists (but not the
rhetoricians) are in possession of “practices and routines, which, if followed, will
31 Berger, “Applying New Rhetoric,” 155.
32 Billig, Arguing and Thinking, 141.
33 Ibid., 92–93.
34 Ibid., 117.
35 Ibid., 117.
36 Ibid., 121–122.
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reveal the hidden truths.”37 Unlike Aristotle, modern psychologists (Billig argues)
are more concerned with the form than they are with the content of the arguments.
For Billig, as you move from the rhetoric of form to the rhetoric of content, you
realize that the rhetoric of content is the active and “irreducibly argumentative”
process of constructing thought.38
INVITATIONAL AND DIALOGIC RHETORIC IN THE WORLD
If invitational rhetoric consists of an invitation to try on the speaker’s view of the
world as a means to create a relationship, what might invitational rhetoric look like
in everyday life? Invitational rhetoric surely does not appear (except in
a manipulative way) during a job interview or on a first date. Something like
invitational rhetoric may take place in the practice of transformative mediation,39
or perhaps within some settlement negotiations – those between relatively equal
parties with strong incentives to settle and remain in a beneficial relationship. As for
dialogic rhetoric, Billig’s perspective that “[t]hinking is a form of internal argument,
modeled on outward dialogue”40 hints at the illustrative example of the active debate
that the writer may have about the pros and cons of a series of arguments, either with
herself or with others in a collaborative or workshop format.
Beyond the examples provided by Foss andGriffin, several authors have suggested
that the introductory speeches given by the wives of U.S. Presidential candidates at
nominating conventions are exemplars of invitational rhetoric. Though this setting
seems far afield from legal rhetoric, the qualities making these speeches representa-
tive of invitational rhetoric may translate to other settings.41
According to Elizabeth Petre, a communications researcher, invitational rhetoric
is designed to offer perspectives and create external conditions that allow others to
listen to ideas openly and without predetermined judgment. The forms of invita-
tional rhetoric do not necessarily lead to persuasion, but they may encourage
audience members to understand and participate in the perspectives of the speaker
37 Ibid., 95.
38 Ibid., 113.
39 Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation: The Transformative Approach
to Conflict (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2005) (defining transformative mediation as
suggesting that “[t]he unique promise of mediation lies in its capacity to transform the quality of
conflict interaction itself, so that conflicts can actually strengthen both the parties themselves and the
society they are part of”): 13.
40 In response to the anticipated feminist argument that he had “taken a predominantly masculine
activity – arguing – and celebrated it as the basis of thinking,” Billig sought to differentiate “rhetoric”
from “dialogue” and to suggest that the rhetoric of dialogue should be reclaimed. Billig, Arguing and
Thinking, 26–29.
41 Elizabeth A. Petre, “Understanding Epideictic Purpose as Invitational Rhetoric in Women’s Political
Convention Speeches,” Kaleidoscope: A Graduate Journal of Qualitative Communication Research 6
(Fall 2007) 21–37; Gwen Brown, “Change in the Communication Demands of Spouses in the 2012
Nominating Convention,” in ed. Robert E. Denton, Jr., The 2012 Presidential Campaign:
A Communication Perspective (Rowman & Littlefield 2014).
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and to “try on” the speaker’s view of the world. Petre identified several aspects of
invitational rhetoric in representative speeches by the Presidential candidates’ wives,
including the women’s references to American history and culture as markers of
values shared with audiences and their use of storytelling to show the human side of
the candidate. For example, in 2008,Michelle Obama began her introduction of her
Presidential candidate husband by saying that he served as a reminder to the nation
of the great American success story. She went on to tell the story of Barack Obama as
a young man who picked her up for dates in a car so rusted out that she could see the
pavement below.42
In addition to references that identify or forge shared values and personal stories
that show shared humanity, Gwen Brown pointed to three other strategies of
invitational rhetoric that were present in the speeches. First, the candidates’ wives
began their speeches with allusions designed to create a sense of intimacy, thus
constituting an “invitation to understanding as a means to create a relationship.”
Through conversational beginnings, the speeches encouraged rapport, building on
the feeling of an interpersonal relationship and an informal exchange. Next, the
candidates’ wives depended on a sense of “positional advantage,” that is, the spouse
was uniquely positioned not only to know but also to verify the candidate’s character.
Third, the candidates’ wives defined their husbands by defining themselves in
favorable ways, suggesting that the audiences could “see” the candidates better by
understanding the candidate’s wives as a reflection of the candidate’s achievements
and qualities.
Although not labeled invitational rhetoric, analogous examples have been
offered by scholars in other disciplines. For example, Cheryl Nixon and Janet
Landman observed a transformative rhetorical change in the course of their
research into the ethical development of Katherine Power, a 1970s antiwar mili-
tant. Power was waiting in a getaway car when a police officer was killed during
a bank robbery undertaken by members of her group.43 After more than twenty
years in hiding, Power turned herself in, pleaded guilty, and began serving a prison
sentence. Later, she requested early parole, and during the parole hearing, she
expressed remorse and took responsibility for the death. The daughter of the slain
police officer responded skeptically, saying that any criminal seeking parole would
express similar sentiments. Power withdrew her request so that her apology would
not be tainted by self-interest. According to the authors, Power’s act of withdrawing
the request apparently allowed the daughter to “try on” Power’s perspective and to
see her in a different light: Powers had shifted out of the category of “remorseless
42 Petre, “Understanding Epideictic Purpose.”
43 Nixon and Landman, “Turning Our Minds.” In their review of Amsterdam and Bruner’s Minding
the Law, Cheryl Nixon and Janet Landman, professors of English and pshychology, respectively, raised
the question of positive uses of rhetoric. They note that Amsterdam and Bruner convincingly show the
problems of categorization and then offer counter-examples relating to the positive effects of
categories.
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murderer/adversary/enemy” and into the category of “sincerely remorseful and
self-admittedly culpable human being.”44
Nixon and Landman attributed this rhetorical change (rhetorical because
a category shift) to Power’s action of withdrawing her request rather than to her
rhetoric. Nonetheless, they proposed that dialogue (without accompanying action)
might be used to effect similar category shifts.45 Here, the authors recounted an
interview in which Landman matched Power with former Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara and proposed to ask him questions similar to those she had asked Power,
questions about how writing his memoir might have helped him transform himself.
Landman discussed with Power the nervousness she felt about the prospect of the
interview. “Power suggested that when Landman talked with McNamara, she
should forget about his fame – and his reputation as something of a bully – and
remember that he is just a flawed and suffering human being – like [Power herself.]”
The authors speculated that in contrast to her original antipathy for McNamara,
Power’s new empathy for McNamara might have been influenced by Landman’s
admiration for McNamara’s admissions of regret and by Landman’s linking Power
and McNamara together as counterparts. In other words, the dialogical process
brought about the change: “human dialogue was a source of Power’s newfound
ability to extend her sympathy to the formerly demonized Robert McNamara.”46
Dialogue is of course central to Billig’s conception of rhetoric, in which the
elements of dialogue and two-sidedness inherent in argumentation make it essential
to thinking. A similar connection between arguing and thinking is well established
in classical and contemporary rhetorical thought.47 Aristotle “showed how argu-
ments could always be opposed by counter-arguments, justification by criticisms . . .
in the looser atmosphere of rhetoric.”48 Protagoras elaborated from the practice of
rhetoric a philosophy suggesting that in every question there were two sides to the
argument.49
Recognizing that there is also an ancient connection between persuasion and
rhetoric, Billig disputes the related conclusion that “arguments are countered and
justifications are offered primarily in order to alter the opinions of the other.”
Instead, he suggests that rhetoric’s purpose is the never-ending “search for the last
word.”50 The outcome of dialogue in Billig’s terms is not accord: instead, “[t]he
image is one of chatter and discussion. Any accord which is reached is to be
breached. The power of speech is not the power to command obedience by
44 Nixon and Landman, “Turning Our Minds,” 179–180.
45 Ibid., 183.
46 Ibid., 183.
47 See Anthony T. Kronman, “Rhetoric,” University of Cincinnati Law Review 67 (1999): 677, 691
(discussing rhetoric as a place to stand between pure power and pure reason).
48 Billig, Arguing and Thinking, 126.
49 Billig documents the long-recognized connection between thinking and argument, quoting philoso-
phers and rhetoricians from Isocrates to William James. Billig, Arguing and Thinking, 140–147.
50 Billig, Arguing and Thinking, 135–136.
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replacing argument with silence. It is the power to challenge silent obedience by
opening arguments.”51
To explain this perspective, Billig provides numerous examples from classical
rhetorical texts and from the Talmud, including the following account. First, Billig
recounts the debate between the Jewish Elders and some others (apparently
Romans) who worship idols:
The debate starts with the Romans challenging the Elders with the reasonable, but
tricky question: Why, if God so disapproves of idolatry, does He not destroy all the
idols? The Elders reply that He would certainly do so if the idolators only wor-
shipped useless objects. The problem was that idolators worshipped necessary
objects such as the sun, moon, stars and planets. Destruction of these would entail
God destroying His whole creation: “Shall He then make an end of His world
because of fools?” The Romans are not satisfied by this answer, but they counter it
with a further, and more difficult challenge: If God does not want to destroy the
world, then let Him destroy only the useless idols. Back comes the reply of the
Elders. If God destroyed your useless idols, but kept the sun, moon, stars and
planets, what would you say? You would, of course, say that these were the true
deities, because they had been untouched by the destruction of idols.52
This might appear to be a fitting ending to the conversation. But Billig points out
that this example is taken from the Mishnah and may be only the starting point for
further discussions and stories in the Gemarah.53 In the Gemarah, as Billig recounts
it, there is a continuing debate between rabbinical sages as they argue the merits of
various replies to a further question from the Romans: “Why did I not reply: if your
God does not wish to destroy the useful or the useless idols, then why, oh why, does
He not destroy us useless idolators?” The first account satisfies the need for the last
word and neatly resolves a dilemma. “On the other hand, the more sophisticated are
encouraged to see the need for further thought . . . Here there is no clear last word,
but different argumentative themes seek their last word in various directions.”54
IN RE DAVIS: THE SUPREME COURT
In 2011, Troy Davis was executed for the 1989 murder of police officer Mark
MacPhail. In the twenty years between his sentencing and his execution, Davis
51 Ibid., 78.
52 Ibid., 130–131.
53 Ibid., 130. Billig explains the two parts of the Talmud as follows:
there is the older Mishnah, which consists predominantly of the decisions of Rabbinical authorities on
basic questions of Jewish Law. Typically, the Mishnah presents a compressed statement of the
difference of opinion between two authorities . . . The largest part of the Talmud is the Gemarah,
which uses the decisions of the Mishnah as a starting-point for further discussions and story-telling.
Ibid.
54 Billig, Arguing and Thinking, 139–140.
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raised the claim of “actual innocence,” the label used by lawyers to distinguish
a claim that a defendant was in fact innocent from a claim that relies on constitu-
tional error in the proceedings. To succeed, the claim of “actual innocence” usually
requires the defendant to do more than establish innocence; instead, the defendant
must submit additional evidence not available at the time of trial. As Justice Scalia
was to proclaim, “[t]his Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the
execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later
able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.”55
In a highly unusual decision in 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court transferred Davis’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia for further “hearing and determination,” ordering that “[t]he
District Court should receive testimony and make findings of fact as to whether
evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial clearly establishes
petitioner’s innocence.”56
Switching the usual order, Justice Stevens’ concurrence responded to the criti-
cism contained in Justice Scalia’s dissent. In dissenting, Justice Scalia had charac-
terized the ruling that the claim should be heard by a lower court as an
“extraordinary step – one not taken in nearly fifty years – of instructing a district
court to adjudicate a state prisoner’s petition for an original writ of habeas corpus.”57
Summarizing his objections, Justice Scalia wrote that the Court “proceeds down this
path even though every judicial and executive body that has examined petitioner’s
stale claim of innocence has been unpersuaded, and (to make matters worst) even
though it would be impossible for the District Court to grant any relief.” Relief
would be impossible, Justice Scalia said, because “petitioner’s claim is a sure loser.”
Thus, asking the District Court to review his petition “can serve no purpose except to
delay the State’s execution of its lawful criminal judgment.”58
Justice Stevens countered that Justice Scalia was wrong in assuming that Davis
had committedmurder and that the trial court would have no power to grant relief.59
Instead, Justice Stevens concluded, the risk of putting an innocent man to death was
an exceptional one that sufficiently justified the transfer. Justice Stevens pointed out
that seven of the State’s key witnesses had recanted their trial testimony; several
individuals had implicated the State’s principal witness as the shooter; and “no
court,” state or federal, “has ever conducted a hearing to assess the reliability of the
score of [postconviction] affidavits that, if reliable, would satisfy the threshold
showing for a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence.”60 As for Justice
Scalia’s claim that the district court would have no power to do anything about
55 In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56 130 S. Ct. at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
57 Ibid. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid. at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
60 Ibid.
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Davis’s claim, Justice Stevens responded that there were a number of unresolved
issues of interpretation that might allow the district court to act:
Justice Scalia would pretermit all of these unresolved legal questions on the theory
that we must treat even the most robust showing of actual innocence identically on
habeas review to an accusation of minor procedural error. Without briefing or
argument, he concludes that Congress chose to foreclose relief and that the
Constitution permits this. But imagine a petitioner in Davis’s situation who pos-
sesses new evidence conclusively and definitively proving, beyond any scintilla of
doubt, that he is an innocent man. The dissent’s reasoning would allow such
a petitioner to be put to death nonetheless. The Court correctly refuses to endorse
such reasoning.61
After holding a hearing, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
found that even though “executing an innocent person would violate the United
States Constitution, Mr. Davis has failed to prove his innocence.”62
THE SETTING OF THE SENTENCING HEARING
When he was charged in 1989, Troy Davis was twenty years old. The slain police
officer, Mark MacPhail, was twenty-seven, married, and the father of a two-year-old
daughter and an infant son. Officer MacPhail was off duty and working as a security
guard when he apparently tried to defend a homeless man being assaulted in
a parking lot. He was shot and killed by one of the several men involved in the
assault. MacPhail had spent six years as an Army Ranger before joining the
Savannah police in 1986.
During the August 1991 trial, several witnesses testified that they saw Davis shoot
MacPhail, and other witnesses testified that Davis had confessed the murder to
them. Testifying in his own defense, Davis denied the shooting, saying that he had
fled the scene before any shots were fired. The jury, which included seven black
members, took two hours to find Davis guilty of the murder. The sentencing hearing
followed almost immediately. The jurors saw the same attorneys, and they heard
from the defendant, his family members, and some neighbors. They did not hear
from the victim’s family. Following seven hours of deliberation, the jury recom-
mended the death penalty, and Davis was sentenced to death. Davis continued to
maintain his innocence through his execution in 2011.63
61 Ibid.
62 Order, In re Davis, Case No. CV4090130, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
(August 24, 2010).
63 These facts are taken from different sources, including the Supreme Court decision and the U.S.
District Court decision. For an expanded summary, see Michael McDonnell Hill, “Seen but Not
Heard: An Argument for Granting Evidentiary Hearings to Weigh the Credibility of Recanted
Testimony,” Georgia Law Review 46 (2011): 213, 215–222.
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To save the lives of their clients, death penalty lawyers often identify two com-
plementary goals. First, they hope to show that the defendant shares with the jurors
some of the qualities and characteristics of being human. Recognizing a common
humanity, the jurors may be open to considering whether everything they need to
know about the defendant’s life has been revealed by their knowledge of the
defendant’s actions in the few moments that led to the defendant’s conviction.
To accomplish this first goal, death penalty lawyers need to tell stories that widen
the lens and fill out the jurors’ picture of the defendant while remaining believable
and consistent with what the jurors already know about the world. Second, death
penalty lawyers hope to show that their defendant’s life is worth saving. For this goal,
they need to tell stories that may be much more difficult to construct, ones that are
individual, unique, full of tragedy, yet hinting at the possibility of redemption.64
Only the first of these goals will be discussed in this chapter. Putting flesh on the
bones of the defendant’s acts is important because of “the widely held belief that
jurors and judges will only condemn those whom they see as fundamentally ‘other,’
as inhuman, and as outside the reach of the community of compassionate beings.”65
Even when the particular defendant is not sympathetic, the use of a “narrative
strategy ensures that this audience is confronted with humanity in all of its complex-
ity and with all of its failings.”66
The capital sentencing hearing is a complex rhetorical situation.67 As Billig points
out, in every trial, both direct examination and “cross-examination represent[]
a peculiar discourse, in which the audience overhears a conversation between the
advocate and another person, which is spoken in order to be overheard.”68 In the
sentencing hearing, the peculiarity is multiplied. First, who is the rhetor, the person
taking purposeful rhetorical action? Although the prosecution and defense attorneys
shape and elicit the rhetoric of the hearing, theymost often do so through themedium
of witnesses. Next, what is the “exigence” or the imperfection in the world needing to
be addressed by rhetoric? Fittingly, rhetoric is needed here to address the lack of a “last
word” pronouncing the ultimate outcome for a criminal defendant who has already
been found guilty of murder in a situation that the prosecutor found suitable for the
death penalty. The immediate, internal audience of the jury members – the audience
that can do something to resolve the exigence – is joined by a number of future and
more or less external audiences, from themedia reporters to the appellate court to later
decision makers and beyond. The constraints in this rhetorical situation are not only
those associated with any legal trial but also the complications and exaggerated
concerns that arise because of the special circumstances of capital sentencing.
64 Austin Sarat, “Narrative Strategy Death Penalty Advocacy,” 31Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law
Review 31 (1996): 353.
65 Ibid., 370–371.
66 Ibid., 373.
67 See Lloyd Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 1:1 (January 1968): 3.
68 Billig, Arguing and Thinking, 118.
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Many factors make it more difficult to communicate a fuller and more human
portrait of the defendant in a capital sentencing hearing. Not only is the jury the
same jury that heard the guilt phase of the trial, the jury has also been death qualified
(or found to be capable of rendering a verdict of death), indicating that the jurors
may have underlying values, beliefs, and predispositions that will be hard to over-
come. To satisfy the jurors’ needs for coherence and consistency, a jury having found
a defendant guilty of murder may be likely to follow through with the sentence that
seems fitting. Doing something other thanmeting out the punishment sought would
disrupt the cultural narrative that tells us that wrongdoing is to be followed by the
punishment the wrongdoer deserves.
THE SENTENCING PHASE FOR TROY DAVIS
The sentencing phase of the trial was held in late August and early September of
1991. Defense attorneys Robert Barker, Robert Falligant, and Nancy Askew intro-
duced testimony from Troy Davis’s mother, Virginia Davis, and his two sisters,
Martina Correia and Kimberly Shawn Davis. His family continued to work for
Troy’s69 exoneration during the twenty years that he would be in prison before
being executed in 2011. His mother, Virginia Davis, died a few months before the
execution. Martina, the older sister who was in the military at the time of the
murder, died of breast cancer several months after the execution. Kimberly,
known by her family as Shawn, was Troy’s younger sister with multiple sclerosis.
Friends and neighbors
Other than the family members, the defense witnesses were largely ineffective from
any rhetorical point of view. William Van Antwerp testified that Troy worked for
him, but under cross examination, he said that Davis’s reputation in the community
was “of mixed reviews” and that his reputation for violence or peacefulness “varies
also, depending upon the situation and at what particular time.”70 Silas Frazier, who
testified that Davis was a nephew by marriage, was asked whether he saw “Troy step
in and practically take over as the father of the house.” His response: “Well, I wasn’t
living there in that section at the time, so I didn’t know too much what was
happened, but I know he was, because my wife, we’re not together now, but I’ve
heard her tell about that.”71
69 Because this section focuses on the invitation to see the defendant as his family saw him, I refer to
Mr. Davis as Troy.
70 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript of the proceedings at the sentencing phase of the trial (August 29–30,
September 3, 1991) (on file with author).
71 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 44.
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The sole exception was Jonathan Julius Law, better known as Joe. He testified that
as a young boy, Troy came over to his house and tried to comfort the family after
Law’s son died. According to Law,
It really was hard for me to believe when I heard that he was involved in this. I still
don’t hardly believe it, but still, the Lord knows worse than I do . . . she would take
them to church and they were very good neighbors. I don’t know nothing bad about
them or wrong about them. It’s very hard to me – his father left them. I guess
everything went wrong.72
The mother
Virginia Davis’s testimony provided a potential opening for invitational rhetoric.
Although she had testified in the guilt phase of the trial that Troy was home with her
the night of the shooting, testimony that undermined her later credibility, the
defense attorney might have used Mrs. Davis as the medium for inviting the jury
to enter the world of the defendant. In this way, the jurors might have been able to
see Troy as his mother, sisters, and brothers saw him: one member of an ordinary
family engaged in the struggles and commonplaces of daily life.
Mr. Barker conducted the direct examination of Virginia Davis, establishing that
Troy was twenty when the murder occurred, the family included five children and
had lived at the same address for more than twenty years, she had worked in
a hospital for much of that time, and she had been divorced for seven or eight
years at the time of the trial. This line of questioning placed Troy within a new
context, an effort designed to broaden and deepen the jury’s understanding as they
considered the next stage of Troy’s life. The Davis family members were long-time
residents of Savannah; they were stable and well established in their neighborhood;
Mrs. Davis was a hard-working single mother of five children; Troy Davis was
a teenager when he had to take on a good deal of responsibility after his father left
the house.
Q: Since the age of fourteen, has Troy been pretty well the man of the house?
A: Yes, he has.
Troy’s younger sister Shawn contracted multiple sclerosis when she was sixteen
and he was seventeen. While Shawn was in the hospital and learning to walk again,
Troy worked, went to school, and took care of the family during the day while
Mrs. Davis was at work.
Q: Did you ever have to worry about your children being in Troy’s company or in
his custody?
A: No, sir, I never had to worry about them, because after he would pick them up
from school, and took them home and fed them, he would bring them back and
72 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 42.
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they would stay to the hospital until about nine or ten o’clock at night, then he
would take them home.73
***
So Troy would take [Shawn] to [school] in the mornings, come back home, and
he would take Nicky and Lester to school, and then maybe about a quarter to
twelve he would pick her up from [school]. He would bring her to Candler to
therapy, and after therapy, . . . they wouldwait ‘til one-thirty, and I would knock off
and I would go home and then he would take the car and go on to Captain D’s.
Q: Did you force him to do all of this?
A: No, sir, I did not force him to do it, because he wasmy eldest son, and he was just
like a father figure to them, because their father wasn’t at home, so he took on
the responsibility of being a father and a son.74
***
Mrs. Davis also testified about how Troy had provided financial support for the
family.
Q: [W]hat would he do with his check from work?
A: Well, when Troy got paid off, wherein it was like every other week, well, when
I come home from work, Troy would go to the Savannah Bank and cash his
check . . . and he would leave his check on the dresser with a note and he say,
mama, you take this for the bills. He say, I have enough money for gas. That’s all
I need.
He say, you pay the light bill or either you go to the grocery store, and I didn’t
even have to ask him for a certain amount of money. If he made a hundred
dollars, Troy would give me eighty dollars or eighty-five dollars out of that
hundred dollars, which was voluntary. I did not have to ask him for it.75
***
Finally, the defense attorney asked the mother to speak directly to the jury.
Q: Ms. Davis, do you have anything you want to say to the jury?
A: Yes, I do. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, Troy Davis, he is not a bad person
they way it was put out, looked like, like all the evidence say. He was a good
person. He was a father and a brother to my children. He was a good son, he was
a good provider for his family.
***
Courtroom rules and conventions as well as practical constraints interfered with the
defense attorneys’ ability to use the mother’s testimony as an invitation to the jury to
“try on” her perspective of Troy. Having just been through a trial with a good deal of
conflicting testimony that at least some of the jury members found unbelievable or
73 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 16.
74 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 17–18.
75 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 18–20.
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disregarded, the jurors might have listened skeptically from the start. To maintain
consistency, they would have to try to understand the new evidence as not being
contradictory to the finding of guilt they had just returned. In any trial, the mother of
the defendant likely would be viewed as capable of lying to protect her child. Here,
that skepticism was heightened. GivenMrs. Davis’s testimony during the guilt phase
of the trial, some of the jurors were already persuaded that Mrs. Davis was not only
capable of lying but was likely to lie for her son. Added to that incredulity, the jurors
might have viewed this entire line of direct questioning and apparently rehearsed
answers as an attorney-authored and attorney-concocted storyline rather than an
authentic recounting.
As for coherence and plausibility, all the evidence the jury had heard during the
guilt phase of the trial left them with an entirely different picture of Troy.
Invitational rhetoric’s goal is not to replace that picture with an image of perfection,
but instead to put flesh on the stark outlines drawn by the trial. Given all they had
heard before, to succeed in using the mother’s testimony to invite the jury to
understand her view of Troy would require her to acknowledge that Troy was
sometimes an imperfect son and brother as she depicted in small, concrete, and
specific ways that he often behaved and acted in ways andmanners that were like the
conduct and characteristics of other people the jurors know. Instead, her character-
izations were too lacking in details, too rote, too abstract, and too good to be true.
To be plausible, to invite understanding, her testimony should have captured and
displayed believable, familiar, and recognizable snapshots of daily life. In that way,
the characterizations might have been accepted as authentic and reliable details
adding depth and dimension to the jurors’ understanding of Troy.
The older sister
In contrast, the older sister told several stories that might have allowed the jury to see
Troy as a fully formed character, neither a hero nor a villain.Martina Correia, Troy’s
older sister and a combat medical specialist who was on a leave of absence from the
military for the trial, was also working at Candler Hospital at the time of her
testimony.
Q: Start back when Troy was a little boy and tell of your personal relationship
with him.
A: Well, as we were growing up, by me being the oldest daughter, and Troy being
the oldest son, Troy was taught mostly to protect the household and to look after
his younger brothers and sisters . . .
Q: . . . did Troy take part in your marriage?
A: When I got married, for different reasons my father was unable to give me away,
and I thought I was going to have to postpone my wedding or either cancel it,
and my brother Troy came to me and told me that, you know, I wouldn’t have to
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cancel my wedding, that he would give me away and be the best man, ‘cause he
told me that we always had to stick together, and that I was going to get married
on time with my plans.
In this way, Marina invited the audience members to “try on” her perspective of
her brother, someone who would stand by his sister and help her go ahead with her
plans in the absence of her father. This characterization did not seek to persuade the
jury but instead invited the jury inside to picture and understand how Marina saw
her brother – as someone whose character and humanity went beyond the acts
associated with the murder of Officer MacPhail.
When Marina was asked to directly address the jury, she told another story that
invited understanding of Troy’s relationships with others and provided context for
a comment that the defense would use against him later (“things happen for
a reason”).
Q: Marina, is there anything else you want to tell the jury?
A: Yes. I’m asking the jury to spare my brother’s life . . .
I’ve seen my brother with a man that used to live down the street. His young
son died, and my brother went down there and told them that he would be their
temporary son until they got over their grief for their child. And my brother
would go down there and help them do things around the house, and he’d sit up
with this man and his wife, and sit and talk to them and comfort them, and he
would always say, well, mama, I’m going down toMrs. Joe’s house, and I used to
sit and watch this lady hug my brother and comfort my brother like he was her
son. He would never say anything. He would always comfort them and make
them feel like, you know, their son has gone to a better place, that they didn’t
have a real bad loss, that he was with God.76
***
The youngest children
The judge said no when the defense asked to introduce letters from the younger
brother and the younger sister who wanted to express their feelings that way “rather
than bring them in here.” The judge responded: “Counselor, they can express them
on the witness stand . . .”77
The younger sister
Troy’s younger sister, Kimberly Leshawn Davis, testified that she was diagnosed with
multiple sclerosis when she was sixteen and that she was in the hospital for three
months. Like her older sister, Shawn provided small snippets of life events, capturing
76 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 29.
77 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 32.
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believable moments in which Troy appeared genuinely and ordinarily human, a big
brother who was pushing his little sister to do more than she wanted to do.
A: if it was not for Troy, I wouldn’t be walking now. Troy told me, Shawn, you gotta
have that strength, and you gotta have that faith. I used to be in my wheelchair.
He’d put me in the driveway in my wheelchair, and he’d say, Shawn, he’ll say,
stand up and walk to me . . .
I first started out walking in my walker for a couple of months, and then he
told me, he say, we gonna have to put this walker down, and I want you to walk
on your own, and we would be in the yard, and Troy, he would stand up, he
would say, Shawn, walk to me.78
Troy Davis
Mr. Barker conducted the direct examination of Troy, now twenty-three. He testified
in what the prosecution later characterized as a robotic manner. The attorney asked
about the aftermath of his father’s leaving and his sister’s becoming ill.
Q: Did you get an afternoon job also?
A: I wanted to stay away from needing, you know, saying, my father do things for
me. So that’s when I went to Cap’n D’s to get a job on my own to see how I do it
by myself.79
Viewed as invitational rhetoric, this short answer invited the audiencemembers to
understand Troy’s need to do things for himself, by himself, after his father left.
The next answer invited understanding of the shock to the family that came from
Shawn’s onset of illness.
Q: Did [Shawn’s] illness hurt the family . . . [?]
A: Well, her illness, it hurt the whole family a great deal because just out of the blue
it just happened.
***
Another piece of testimony seemed to presage the comment that would be used by
the prosecution to indicate Troy’s lack of remorse.
Q: Tell the jury what you would do in reference to your sister . . .
A: . . . I had so much faith, I told her, you know, ‘cause she used to constantly cry
and say, Troy, why me? You know, and I would like, Shawn, you can’t just say
why me, because things in life, you know, they happen for a reason. And for that
reason she had to find out herself.
***
Because it appeared several times, in a string of unrelated references, “things happen
for a reason”might have been perceived as more understandable, and less unfeeling,
78 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 50–51.
79 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 56.
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had it been accompanied by an explanation of its relationship to some specific
influence or person in Troy’s life.
Q: Troy, do you have anything you want to tell the jury before you come down?
A. Yes, sir. I would like for y’all to take into consideration to spare my life, because
I understand y’all came to a decision about me personally through what
witnesses stated. But really what I want to say is, you have to get to know me to
understand me. I was never a bad person. I never did bad things throughmy life.
I was always a loving person. I would never do anything to hurt anyone.
***
Just give me my life back, you know, because what happened to Officer
MacPhail, it was bad, you know, and my sympathy goes out to his wife and
the rest of the family. I was praying for them ever since day one this incident
happened, that they be strong and that she will one day know that everything in
life happens for a reason, and I was praying that her family members, you know,
don’t hate me what I’m accused of.80
During cross examination, prosecutor Lawton asked Davis to confirm that he had
testified that he used to say to Shawn that “things happen for a reason” and that he
had just said that he prayed that the MacPhail family would realize that things
happen for a reason.
Q: What reason would you offer that Officer MacPhail was shot and killed by you?
A: Well, personally I couldn’t offer for a reason, but it states in the Bible that
everything in life happens for a reason. But it’s not up to man to decide what that
reason is. Only God knows.81
The attorneys’ arguments
After the jury had lunch and returned, the prosecutor made his argument. First, he
pointed out that even though Davis’s mother had testified tearfully and sincerely at
the sentencing hearing, she had also testified during the trial itself: then, “she simply
did not tell you the truth.”82 Moreover, he said, “[i]t’s also reasonable to ask why she
didn’t cry for what he had done, but instead reserved all of her tears for what may be
done to him in answer for that.”83
Using the required forms of the sentencing hearing to set up his argument, the
prosecutor pointed out that most of the other witnesses were questioned by leading
questions and thus “[i]t must be left to your judgment to determine to what extent
those questions and those answers were essentially orchestrated.”84 He further
80 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 60.
81 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 61.
82 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 70.
83 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 72.
84 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 73.
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maligned the defense attorneys by saying, “[t]he way this has been set up, poor
Shawn, the most helpless member of the family, has been made the vehicle in here
by which the entire burden of the defense in the penalty phase is being carried.”
Nonetheless, he acknowledged that “it can’t be denied that the Davises are
a respectable family, they live in a respectable neighborhood.”85
Next, he characterized Davis’s testimony: “He testified like an automaton. He
testified like a robot. There was no change in the inflection of his voice, whether he
was talking about cutting the lawn, taking care of his sister, or shooting Officer
MacPhail, which, by the way, he continues to deny. But you saw him. He’d just sit
there and blandly shrug his shoulders and say, there’s a reason for everything.”86
Listing seven reasons for imposing the death sentence, the prosecutor focused on
Davis’s lying to the jury and then called upon the jury to use Davis’s refusal to admit
guilt as a justification for showing him no compassion: “And yet he has the gall to sit
up here this morning and in that grand way of his insist that you should give him –
you should show him pity, while he denies even his own responsibility . . . Of what is
pity given, except to an acknowledgement of responsibility.”87
Responding, another of Troy’s attorneys, Ms. Askew, listed the mitigating circum-
stances: “[Troy] has never had a childhood . . . He just simply had to grow up too
soon . . . these are family-oriented people . . . [Martina testified that] my brother is
the foundation of my family . . . [Kimberly testified that] if it were not for Troy,
I would not be walking today.” These factors, she said “show that Mr. Davis is
redeemable . . . Is there no good that you can see in this man? . . . Don’t you feel that
it’s better to be on the side of compassion than severity? It’s your decision, irrever-
sible, if you impose the death penalty . . . I feel that you will go back and that you will
do the right thing, and that you will return a life sentence.”88The jury deliberated for
the afternoon and part of the next day, and then returned a sentence of death.
Twenty years later, it was carried out.
Reimagining the sentencing hearing
Using a capital sentencing hearing to explore invitational and dialogic conceptions
of rhetoric is not the same thing as advocating restorative justice89 nor is it analogous
85 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 73.
86 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 73.
87 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 75–76.
88 Georgia v. Davis, Transcript 79–80.
89 The most common form of restorative justice (RJ below) has been characterized as a dialogue:
As a component of the sentencing process, I take it that the essential features of RJ dialogue would
include the following: (1) the offender meets face-to-face with the victim, representatives of the
victim, and/or representatives of the community; (2) the meeting involves a facilitated dialogue in
which all participants are given an opportunity to share their views of the offense and its con-
sequences; (3) participants seek consensus as to appropriate restorative measures to repair harm
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to calling for the inclusion or exclusion of victim impact statements.90 Those
initiatives share with invitational rhetoric a preference for engaging in dialogue
leading to greater understanding rather than the more traditional preference for
engaging in argument leading to victory or defeat. But they differ from invitational
and dialogic rhetoric in their purposes and in their corresponding assumptions
about who or what is to be centrally transformed.
Recall that “[i]nvitational rhetoric constitutes an invitation to the audience to
enter the rhetor’s world and to see it as the rhetor does.” Add Billig’s advocacy of the
long-recognized connection between arguing and thinking, and his claim that an
argument can only be understood within its argumentative context. In this context,
then, in contrast with the prosecution’s focus on Troy as no more than the sum of his
criminal acts, the defense attorneys might use their witnesses as the media through
whom an invitation is conveyed to the jury to see Troy in a different light.
The defense witnesses invite the jury to see Troy as his family has known him
through the years before the murder – as a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old looking
after his younger brothers and sisters, as a helpful big brother to his closest sister
struggling with a serious and frightening disease, as a helpful younger brother when
his oldest sister planned to marry, as a son who took on the role of caregiver and
provider when his father left the family.
Through invitational rhetoric, communication takes place between the jury
members and the defendant as the witnesses seek to transform the jurors’ under-
standing of Troy and of the conflict about the outcome. To aid this communication,
the witnesses should share with the jury some values, beliefs, or history that will
allow the jurors to find common ground (or to identify) with the witnesses.
The witnesses should be capable of being viewed as knowledgeable and truthful, if
caused by the offense, which might include apology, restitution, and community service, in
addition to (or in lieu of) more traditional penal sanctions; and (4) mechanisms are put into
place to ensure the offender’s accountability in performing agreed-upon restorative measures.
The RJ dialogue occurs prior to judicial sentencing. If the dialogue is unsuccessful, or if the
offender chooses not to participate, then the offender might be sentenced in the conventional
manner. If the dialogue produces an agreement, then the agreement might take the place of
a formal judgment or, alternatively, be embodied in the terms of the formal judgment, possibly
along with additional judicially-determined sanctions or conditions.
Michael M. O’Hear, “Is Restorative Justice Compatible with Sentencing Uniformity?” 89Marquette
Law Review 89 (2005): 305, 306–307. For one critic’s view of restorative justice, see Annalise Acorn,
Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice 136 (Vancouver: UBC Press 2004).
90 After the Supreme Court decided that a state’s decision to admit victim impact evidence in a capital
sentencing hearing did not violate the Eighth Amendment, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Georgia statute allowing and limiting such evidence. For example, that statute
states that such evidence “shall be permitted only in such a manner and to such a degree as not to
inflame or unduly prejudice the jury.” Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748, 751 (Ga. 1994). Studies
indicate that allowing such statements increases the likelihood of a capital defendant receiving a death
sentence. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, “Affective Forecasting and Capital Sentencing: Reducing the Effect
of Victim Impact Statements,” 46 American Criminal Law Review 46 (2009): 107, 125.
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only about the events they are describing and not about larger questions of character,
moral blameworthiness, or future dangerousness.
To communicate effectively, the witnesses need not be completely neutral.
Neither the attorneys nor the witnesses in a sentencing hearing are “neutral” as to
the result: simply being called by one side or the other implies partiality. Still, a juror
should be able to set aside the lack of neutrality as to the result in order to understand
that a non-neutral witness can be knowledgeable and truthful about an event that is
tangential to the crime but central to the witness’s relationship with the defendant.
Thus, a juror likely would assume that Mrs. Davis wishes to present the most
favorable picture possible of her son. When she testifies that he was a good substitute
father and a good provider for his family, the juror may discount those summary
characterizations as little more than what any mother would say in any case. But if
Mrs. Davis were to testify about a specific incident – Troy had been given a job by
one of his father’s friends, but when his father left the family, Troy insisted on going
out to get a part-time job on his own because he no longer wanted to depend on his
father – the juror would begin to be able to understand Troy as a person.
The testimony of Troy’s two sisters supports this suggestion. Their believability
was less suspect because they had not testified in the guilt phase of the trial. More
important, they testified about specific moments in their lives, filling in details and
enhancing the jurors’ comprehension of Troy by providing more complicated
accountings of Troy’s conduct and character – Troy stepping in for his absent father
so that Marina could get married, Troy pushing his sister Shawn to stand up and
walk on her own, perhaps coming at a time when she would have preferred to be
sheltered rather than prodded.
Even if invitational rhetoric shows promise when the invitation to understand is
mediated through a witness, it is much more difficult to effectively recast the
testimony of the defendant himself as invitational rhetoric. Even more so than
Mrs. Davis’s, Troy’s testimony would be immediately suspect and incredible to the
jury: they have already found him guilty and that finding required them to disbelieve
much of what he said before. The prosecutor characterized him as testifying during
the penalty phase as an automaton or a robot, a demeanor that likely made it easier to
view him as something other than human. Troy failed to exhibit the emotional
markers that might have humanized him had he shown outward signs of empathy for
the MacPhail family or spoken words of remorse. His testimony that “things happen
for a reason,” which might have been understandable given his religious beliefs,
especially when he used the phrase in somany different contexts, sounded like a lack
of human feeling.
Practical and legal considerations erect high barriers to the use of a defendant’s
testimony as an invitation to the jury to understand another perspective on the
defendant’s life and actions. Admissions of guilt in the sentencing phase carry
consequences. By using the following example, I do not intend to suggest that any
of the alleged confessions recounted by witnesses during the trial were actually true;
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doubt was cast on each of these statements both during and after the trial. Instead,
my intent is to suggest that if a jury had been offered an invitation to understand
a similar situation from the point of view of a similar defendant, that jury would not
have imposed the death penalty. Even if these confessions truthfully described the
actions of anyone who was present, what happened the evening of the murder of
Officer MacPhail seems very far removed from warranting the death penalty,
a penalty that is to be meted out only when it is a just desert, truly fitting the crime.
Would a jury understand the actions of any one of the young men who were
present that evening if the jurors had heard a first-person account of what happened?
On the evening of the shooting, I was with friends. We had gone to a party and then
we were going to a convenience store. One of my friends began arguing with a man
coming out of the convenience store. The man would not give my friend one of the
beers he had just purchased. They argued some more, and then my friend chased
the man toward the Burger King parking lot. I was following them. When they got
close to the Burger King drive-through, they stopped and they started yelling insults
at each other. I was just behind the man when he said something to me. Because he
wouldn’t stop arguing and yelling, I hit him in the head with a gun that my friend
handed me earlier. The man ran to the drive-through window, yelling, “call the
police!” My friend and I started to run. A police officer came around the corner and
told us to “hold it.” “Freeze.”91
The police officer started running towards me. I stopped. I was trying to put the
gun back in my pants to hide it. I couldn’t do it. I couldn’t hide the gun, and
I panicked. The officer was running towards me. He reached for his firearm. He was
about fifteen feet away, and I shot him.92 I thought he got a good look at me and so
I thought, “I have to finish the job.” I shot him again.93
In this version, a defendant who shot a police officer has admitted the murder to
a jury that has already found him guilty of that murder. He becomes recognizably
human if the jurors believe that they share common ground with the defendant: they
have experienced the same emotions (anger and fear) and they have displayed
similar personality traits (loyalty and selfishness). Some measure of understanding
and compassion might follow if the jury members were able to consider the situation
from another perspective, when, for example, the defendant explains to the jurors
why he became angry and struck the man who was arguing and shouting, why he
became panicked when he could not hide the gun, and even why he shot the officer
the second time to protect himself. As an invitation to understand a defendant’s
perspective, this version may be believable and effective because it holds together.
It accords with the jurors’ sense of what happened that night based on their
91 This version is compiled from the testimony as recounted in the Order of the District Court on the
specific pages cited. Order of the District Court 35–36.
92 Order of the District Court 22–23.
93 Order of the District Court 40.
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experience in the guilt phase of the trial. It rings true because it carries echoes of
other stories the jury members have heard.
CONCLUSION
Can the law encompass rhetoric that fails to deliver an ending? As envisioned by
their proponents, invitational rhetoric creates a relationship between an audience
and an “other” by building understanding of the other’s perspective while Billig’s
dialogic rhetoric leads to thought and further argument, thus ensuring a continuing
relationship among the arguers. Together, these visions virtually guarantee continu-
ing uncertainty and open-endedness, not the closed and certain sphere that
Wetlaufer described.
As noted earlier, invitational and dialogic rhetoric already exist within some law
settings. Transformative mediation seems to draw on the same impetus as invita-
tional rhetoric. So may settlement negotiations among equals with continuing
relationships. Courtroom arguments and lawyers’ examinations of witnesses are
dialogic in form if not in substance or desired outcome.
Although this discussion is a preliminary sketch, it suggests several characteristics
of situations in which an emphasis on a more invitational and dialogic rhetoric may
prove valuable. First, the practice of invitational–dialogic rhetoric might flourish
in situations whose purpose is to establish the terms of a future relationship rather
than solely to settle a past score. When there is no last word to be had, that setting
may be most fitting for invitational–dialogic rhetoric. As transformative mediators
point out, this does not mean that those involved must necessarily have an ongoing
relationship that continues after the settlement. Instead, the transformative
approach “assumes that all interactions between people carry relationship signifi-
cance, for however long their interactions last. Therefore, in any situation where the
quality of the interaction matters to the parties and . . . will have an impact on other
possible outcomes,” these approaches have value.94 Second, we might consider
these rhetorical practices in situations in which various actors already fill the role
of witnesses who bring about change in the understanding of intended audiences.
And third, we may focus on particular argument settings in which concrete and
specific incidents recounted by the witnesses might transform understanding.95
Linda Meyer conceives of punishment as “a work,” that is, a working through the
shared memory of a wrong as a wrong.96 The work begins with the drama of a trial
that establishes the sharedmemory of the wrong between the jury and the defendant.
The sentencing is both a settlement of that wrong and the establishment of the terms
of a future relationship. Meyer considers this relationship to involve the witness (the
jury), the defendant, and the victim.
94 Baruch and Folger, The Promise of Mediation, 219.
95 See Ibid., 215 (“The transformation of conflict always occurs at the level of specific comments”).
96 Linda Ross Meyer, The Justice of Mercy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2010): 83–103.
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Through invitational rhetoric, a sentencing may similarly be seen as a settlement
of a wrong that emerges from the more exacting relationship between the defendant
and the jury. Again, this would be a relationship between those who have together
determined (although they have not agreed) that a wrong occurred. In Foss and
Griffin’s description, invitational rhetoric is “a means to create a relationship rooted
in equality, immanent value, and self-determination.”97 For the capital sentencing
hearing, this translates into an invitation from the witness to the jury to see and
understand the defendant through the witness’s eyes. Understanding among the
participants would create a relationship between the jury and the defendant, and in
invitational rhetorical, that relationship would be rooted in equality, the value of
every being, and the right to self-determination. This is the promise of invitational
rhetoric. If we can even imagine such a relationship, wouldn’t that be
transformative?
97 Foss and Griffin, “Beyond Persuasion,” 4.
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